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TOO MUCH MIND AND NOT ENOUGH BRAIN, BODY AND 
CULTURE 
ON WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE IN THE COGNITIVE  
SCIENCE OF RELIGION1 
 
Abstract 
This article is based on work conducted at a research unit that I head at Aarhus Uni-
versity called Religion, Cognition and Culture (RCC). It was originally designated 
as a special research area by the Faculty of Theology at the University and has since 
been integrated as a full-fledged research unit in the Department of the Study of Re-
ligion2. In a recent statement by the RCC, we claim that humans are simultaneously 
biological and cultural beings. In all of hominin history, human biology and culture 
have never been separate. Each newborn infant is both unfinished and uniquely 
equipped, biologically and cognitively organized to flourish in socio-cultural envi-
ronments that its genes could never anticipate. So a perspective on minds not limited 
to brains is required. Thus we must approach cognition as embodied and distributed. 
We must analyze religion by studying the functional organization of the human 
brain, its interaction with the social and cultural worlds that it inhabits and modifies, 
and its developmental constraints and flexibility. The RCC is a European institution, 
obviously. It differs in its approach to cognition from the few institutions in the 
United States, England and Northern Ireland that deal with cognition and religion. 
Whereas the RCC is similar in approach to other European initiatives such as the 
cognition group in Groningen and the research project in Helsinki. Therefore it 
could be claimed that our programmatic insistence on causal links between religion, 
cognition and culture is a peculiarly European approach. In the following, I will ex-
plain how the cognitive science of religion can become more relevant to the com-
parative study of religion and to cutting-edge cognitive science by following this 
European approach. 
                                               
1 This article is a highly edited version of my keynote lecture presented at the EASR 
meeting in Messina in 2009 entitled Religion, Cognition and Culture: A European 
Idea?. 
2 The RCC is closely integrated with the university-wide conglomerate in Aarhus, 
known as MINDLab, as well as the Center for Functionally Integrative Neurosci-
ence (CFIN), and the Cognition, Communication, and Culture (CCC) network, all 
consisting of researchers from the humanities, social sciences, natural sciences, 
health sciences, the university hospitals and the psychiatric hospital. 
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Introduction 
The recent success of and growing interest in the cognitive science of 
religion (CSR) indicates that it has a lot of potential not only for the 
comparative study of religion but also for the cognitive neurosciences. 
Despite these successes, we should not be blind to the fact that a num-
ber of challenges must be overcome in order to ensure future growth 
in the field. My own list of challenges, idiosyncratic as it may be, 
looks like this: 
• accommodating current breakthroughs in the social neurosci-
ences 
• bringing deficient methodological paradigms to terms with cut-
ting edge philosophy of science 
• obtaining both cross-cultural and ecological validity of current 
psychological hypotheses 
• broadening perspectives and theories to accommodate the accu-
mulated knowledge and breakthroughs in the comparative study 
of religion 
• broadening perspectives and theories to accommodate the accu-
mulated knowledge and breakthroughs in semiotics, history, lit-
erature and linguistics 
• recruiting young scholars, especially women scholars, and en-
couraging exchange between the few cognitive science of relig-
ion centers and research units that exist in the world 
In a word, current cognitive science of religion is too much mind and 
not enough brain, body and culture3. It is swiftly becoming esoteric in 
                                               
3 Cf. ARMIN W. GEERTZ. Cognitive approaches to the study of religion, in New Ap-
proaches to the Study of Religion. Volume 2. Textual, Comparative, Sociological, 
and Cognitive Approaches, edited by Peter Antes, Armin W. Geertz, Randi R. 
Warne, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 2004. pp. 347-399; ID.. Religion and cognition: A 
crisis in the academic study of religion?, «Bulletin of the Council of Societies for 
the Study of Religion» XXXVII, 2008, 4, pp. 91-95; JEPPE SINDING JENSEN, The com-
plex worlds of religion: Connecting cultural and cognitive analysis, in Current Ap-
proaches in the Cognitive Science of Religion, edited by Ilkka Pyysiäinen, Veikko 
Anttonen, London & New York, Continuum, 2002, pp. 203-228; ID., Religion as the 
unintended product of brain functions in the “standard cognitive science of religion 
model”: On Pascal Boyer, Religion Explained (2001) and Ilkka Pyysiäinen, How 
Religion Works (2003), in Contemporary Theories of Religion: A Critical Compan-
ion, edited by Michael Stausberg, Abingdon & New York, Routledge, 2009, pp. 
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the sense that many studies are coming out now which are exclusively 
and narrowly concerned with proving the hypotheses of an earlier gen-
eration of CSR pioneers and are thus failing to pay attention to current 
trends in cognate sciences. A significant portion of the CSR is caught 
in a limbo, as it were, of its own choosing, by methodologically ignor-
ing neural correlates on the one hand and cultural constraints on the 
other. Thus, many of its results are disembodied, disembrained and 
disencultured. 
I am firmly convinced, however, that we need more scholars of relig-
ion to participate in the cognitive science of religion. If we don’t, then 
psychologists, anthropologists and neurologists will do it for us. I, for 
one, am not satisfied with simply ignoring the challenges that the cog-
nitive sciences present to the comparative study of religion. Our col-
leagues in the cognitive science of religion deserve a much more 
qualified response than they have been getting from some quarters. 
Unfortunately, research on this perhaps most important aspect of the 
study of religion is seriously hampered on all sides for a variety of 
reasons. What one would assume to be the closest and most relevant 
discipline in the study of human cognition, namely psychology, has 
been of little assistance. Either religion is not considered to be a seri-
ous area of research or those who do pursue the psychology of religion 
often do so for religious or spiritual reasons which clearly influence 
the kinds of questions asked, the people studied and the conclusions 
drawn. Furthermore, the results are based on American and, when 
comparative, European, mainly Christian and Judaic, populations4. 
And, as Henrich and colleagues’ humorous title indicates, these are 
simply the WEIRDest people in the world (Western, Educated, Indus-
trialized, Rich and Democratic)5. 
On the other hand, cultural psychology6 and the social psychology of 
                                                                                                              
129-155; JASPER SØRENSEN, Religion, evolution, and an immunology of cultural 
systems, «Evolution and Cognition» X, 2004, 1, pp. 61-73. 
4 DAVID M. WULFF, Psychology of religion: An overview, in Religion and Psychol-
ogy: Mapping the Terrain. Contemporary Dialogues, Future Prospects, edited by 
Diane Jonte-Pace, William B. Parsons, London, Routledge, 2001, pp. 15-29. 
5 JOSEPH HENRICH, STEVEN J. HEINE, ARA NORENZAYAN (in press), The weirdest 
people in the world?, in Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 
6 DAVID MATSUMOTO, LINDA JUANG, Culture and Psychology. Fourth Edition. 4 ed. 
Belmont, Thomson Wadsworth, 2004; reprint, Belmont, Thomson Wadsworth, 
2008. 
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culture7 are still somewhat new, and their results, interesting as they 
are, do not address religion. Similarly, our anthropological colleagues 
who are interested in psychology (not counting cognitive anthropolo-
gists here because they are central actors in the CSR) are often not in-
terested in religion. There are exceptions of course, such as the an-
thology on learning religion indicates8. 
The psychological discipline that comes closest to the interests and 
goals of the CSR calls itself the «empirical psychology of religion»9. 
These studies tell us a lot about religious psychology, although often-
times hampered by exclusive emphasis on American populations. At-
tempts are being made, however, to expand experimental populations 
to non-Western areas. These attempts have their problems, too, such 
as the exaggerated stereotyping of “Western” and “Eastern” psycholo-
gies. 
In the cognitive sciences, there is little interest in religion. A growing 
interest, however, is occurring in the neurosciences. There are many 
problems with most of these studies. First, neuroscientists have a ten-
dency to assume that religious thinking and behavior are monolithic. 
Their generalizations, furthermore, are often based on their own par-
ticular religious background or on the American context. A significant 
number of neurologists studying religion are often driven by a desire 
to find special areas of the brain dedicated to religious thought and 
behavior. These scientists clearly have religious or spiritual agendas10. 
Often, one finds attempts at objectivity in their scientific articles, but 
these are blatantly offset by popularizing books claiming secure 
knowledge about the brain and religion, for which there is, of course, 
                                               
7 CHI-YUE CHIU, YING-YI HONG, Social Psychology of Culture, New York & Hove, 
Psychology Press, 2006. 
8 Learning Religion: Anthropological Approaches, edited by David Berliner, Ramon 
Sarró, New York & Oxford, Berghahn Books, 2007. 
9 Cf. BENJAMIN BEIT-HALLAHMI, MICHAEL ARGYLE, The Psychology of Religious 
Behaviour, Belief and Experience. London, Routledge, 1997; RALPH W. HOOD JR., 
PETER C. HILL, BERNARD SPILKA, The Psychology of Religion: An Empirical Ap-
proach. Fourth Edition. 4th ed. New York & London, The Guilford Press, 2009 and 
Handbook of the Psychology of Religion and Spirituality, edited by Raymond F. 
Paloutzian, Crystal L. Park, New York & London, The Guilford Press, 2005. 
10 ARMIN W. GEERTZ, When cognitive scientists become religious, science is in 
trouble: On neurotheology from a philosophy of science perspective, «Religion» 
XXXIX, 2009, pp. 319-324. 
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no empirical backing. A clear example of this is Andrew Newberg. 
Comparing his balanced and objective chapter Religious and spiritual 
practices: A neurochemical perspective11 with his recent book How 
God Changes Your Brain12, it is clear that in the latter, Newberg is 
pandering to the pop spiritual market in the U.S. Finally, many of the 
neurological studies are poorly designed and/or are based on such 
small numbers of participants that the results can at best only tell us 
something about those particular participants13. 
During the past few years, neurological studies on religion have in-
creased significantly. Interesting as they may be, there are very few 
scholars of religion involved in them14. There are never the less quite 
                                               
11 ANDREW B. NEWBERG, Religious and spiritual practices: A neurochemical per-
spective, in Where God and Science Meet: How Brain and Evolutionary Studies 
Alter Our Understanding of Religion. Volume 2. The Neurology of Religious Ex-
perience, edited by Patrick McNamara, Westport & London, Praeger Publishers, 
2006, pp. 15-31. 
12 ANDREW B. NEWBERG, MARK ROBERT WALDMAN, How God Changes Your 
Brain: Breakthrough Findings from a Leading Neuroscientist, New York, Ballantine 
Books, 2009; reprint, New York, Ballantine Books, 2010. 
13 Such is the case with MARIO BEAUREGARD, VINCENT PAQUETTE, Neural corre-
lates of a mystical experience in Carmelite nuns, «Neuroscience Letters» 405, 2006, 
pp. 186-190; H. BENSON, M.S. MALHOTRA, R.F. GOLDMAN, G.D. JACOBS, Three 
case reports of the metabolic and electroencephalographic changes during ad-
vanced Buddhist meditation techniques, «Behavioral Medicine» XVI, 1990, 2, pp. 
90-95; S.W. LAZAR, G. BUSH, R.L. GOLLUB, G.L. FRICCHIONE, G. KHALSA, H. BEN-
SON (2000), Functional brain mapping of the relaxation response and meditation, 
«NeuroReport» XI, 1991, 5, pp. 1581-1585; ANDREW NEWBERG, A. ALAVI, M. 
BAIME, M. POURDEHNAD, J. SANTANNA, E. D’AQUILI, The measurement of regional 
cerebral blood flow during the complex cognitive task of meditation: A preliminary 
SPECT study, «Psychiatry Research: Neuroimaging» 106, 2001, pp. 113-122; AN-
DREW B. NEWBERG, M. POURDEHNAD, A. & E. D’AQUILI, Cerebral blood flow dur-
ing meditative prayer: Preliminary findings and methodological issues, «Perceptual 
and Motor Skills» LXCVII, 2003, 2, pp. 625-630; ANDREW B. NEWBERG, NANCY A. 
WINTERING, DONNA MORGAN, MARK R. WALDMAN, The measurement of regional 
cerebral blood flow during glossolalia: A preliminary SPECT study, «Psychiatry 
Research: Neuroimaging» 148, 2006, pp. 67-71. See UFFE SCHJØDT, The religious 
brain, «Method and Theory in the Study of Religion» XXI, 2009, 3, pp. 310-339; 
UFFE SCHJØDT, Homeostasis and religious behaviour. «Journal of Cognition and 
Culture» 7, 2007, pp. 313-340. 
14 Exceptions are UFFE SCHJØDT, HANS STØDKILDE-JØRGENSEN, ARMIN W. GEERTZ, 
ANDREAS ROEPSTORFF, Rewarding prayers, «Neuroscience Letters» 443, 2008, pp. 
165-168; UFFE SCHJØDT, HANS STØDKILDE-JØRGENSEN, ARMIN W. GEERTZ, AN-
DREAS ROEPSTORFF, Highly religious participants recruit areas of social cognition 
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a number of interesting studies worthy of our attention15. 
It is quite clear from studies not restricted to religious ideas and be-
havior, that human cognition is embodied, embrained and encultured – 
deeply so on all three counts16. Thus the putative cognitive constraints, 
systems and domains proclaimed by many CSR researchers have a 
peculiar or even metaphysical ring to them. Is HADD, for instance, 
                                                                                                              
in personal prayer, «Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience» 4, 2009, pp. 
199-207; UFFE SCHJØDT, HANS STØDKILDE-JØRGENSEN, ARMIN W. GEERTZ, TOR-
BEN E. LUND, ANDREAS ROEPSTORFF, The power of charisma – perceived charisma 
inhibits the frontal executive network of believers in intercessory prayer, «Social 
Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience» 2010 (in press); NINA P. AZARI, JANPETER 
NICKEL, GILBERT WUNDERLICH, MICHAEL NIEDEGGEN, HARALD HEFTER, LUTZ 
TELLMANN, HANS HERZOG, PETRA STOERIG, DIETER BIRNBACHER, RÜDIGER SEITZ, 
Neural correlates of religious experience, «European Journal of Neuroscience» 13, 
2001, pp. 1649-1652; NINA P. AZARI, Neuroimaging studies of religious experience: 
A critical review, in Where God and Science Meet: How Brain and Evolutionary 
Studies Alter Our Understanding of Religion. Volume 2. The Neurology of Religious 
Experience, edited by Patrick McNamara, Westport & London, Praeger Publishers, 
2006, pp. 33-54. 
15 Here are some interesting examples: LORENZA S. COLZATO, WERY P. M. VAN DEN 
WILDENBERG, BERNHARD HOMMEL, Losing the big picture: How religion may con-
trol visual attention, «PLoS ONE» III, 2008, 11, pp. 1-3; SHIHUI HAN, LIHUA MAO, 
XIAOSI GU, YING ZHU, JIANQIAO GE & YINA MA, Neural consequences of religious 
belief on self-referential processing, «Social Neuroscience» 3, 2007, 1, pp. 1-15; 
SAM HARRIS, JONAS T. KAPLAN, ASHLEY CURIEL, SUSAN Y. BOOKHEIMER, MARCO 
IACOBONI, MARK S. COHEN, The neural correlates of religious and nonreligious 
belief, «PLoS ONE» 4, 2009, 10, pp. 1-9; DIMITRIOS KAPOGIANNIS, ARON K. BAR-
BEY, MICHAEL SU, FRANK KRUEGER, JORDAN GRAFMAN, Neuroanatomical variabil-
ity of religiosity, «PLoS ONE» 4, 2009, 9, pp. 1-7; OSAMU MURAMOTO, The role of 
the medial prefrontal cortex in human religious activity, «Medical Hypotheses» 62, 
2004, pp. 479-485; Ara Norenzayan, Azim F. Shariff, The origin and evolution of 
religious prosociality, «Science» 322, 2008, pp. 58-62; FRED H. PREVIC, The role of 
the extrapersonal brain systems in religious activity, «Consciousness and Cogni-
tion» 15, 2006, pp. 500-539; JEFFREY L. SAVER, JOHN RABIN, The neural substrates 
of religious experience, «Journal of Neuropsychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences» 9, 
1997, 3, pp. 498-510; KATJA WIECH, MIGUEL FARIAS, GUY KAHANE, NICHOLAS 
SCHACKEL, WIEBKE TIEDE, IRENE TRACEY, An fMRI study measuring analgesia 
enhanced by religion as a belief system, «Pain» 139, 2008, pp. 467-476; YANHONG 
WU, CHENG WANG, XI HE, LIHUA MAO & LI ZHANG (2010), Religious beliefs influ-
ence neural substrates of self-reflection in Tibetans, «Social Cognitive and Affective 
Neuroscience» (in press), pp. 1-8. 
16 See Foundations in Social Neuroscience, edited by John T. Cacioppo et al., Cam-
bridge, The MIT Press, 2002. 
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what Justin Barrett claims it to be17, or are there several distinct brain 
processes with differing functions at play? We cannot know this until 
we identify the neural correlates and brain areas that might be active. 
There is a growing literature on the neural correlates of pattern recog-
nition, theory of mind and movement response, which must be taken 
into consideration before the HADD hypothesis can be adequately 
tested. But even if we are more or less sure about the neural correlates, 
it cannot be said that we have discovered task-specific or dedicated 
systems. This is because brain regions are multi-purpose and the only 
proven modules of the brain are dedicated to the sensory-motor sys-
tem18. 
Furthermore, what cultural mechanisms are involved in transforming 
these brain activations into ideas about religiously significant super-
natural beings? Since Barrett’s research relies heavily on Pascal 
Boyer’s work, there is no clear answer to this question. Boyer speaks 
of the Mickey Mouse problem19, but he has not solved it. He simply 
states that God is more important than Mickey Mouse because he is a 
strategic agent, which explains nothing much especially when the 
causal role of culture in cognition is methodologically denied, as in 
Boyer’s case. 
Just because the standard cognitive science of religion is too mentalis-
tic, computational, scientistic, ahistorical and culture-blind does not 
mean that we should give it up. The standard study of religion is 
hardly any better, but we keep plodding away at it nonetheless. Our 
field is too textualistic, culturalistic, anti-scientific, anti-theoretical, 
mind blind and covertly speculative. Much of the history of the study 
of religion is also esoteric. It has often thrived on unenlightened no-
tions of science and the scientific process of discovery. Furthermore, 
many scholars of religion ignore humans. They are more often inter-
ested in religious ideas and religious rituals, but not in what motivates 
people to think and act as they do in their everyday lives, as well as in 
                                               
17 JUSTIN L. BARRETT, Exploring the natural foundations of religion, «Trends in 
cognitive sciences» 4, 2000, pp. 29-34. 
18 LAWRENCE W. BARSALOU, Perceptual symbol systems, «Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences» 22, 1999, pp. 577-660. 
19 PASCAL BOYER, Functional origins of religious concepts: Ontological and strate-
gic selection in evolved minds, «The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute» 
6, 2000, 2, pp. 195-214: pp. 202, 208. 
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ritual circumstances. It is simply assumed that they are motivated by 
religious intentions. But in order to understand human motivation, you 
need to understand human psychology and cognition. I am afraid that 
without the cognitive science of religion as a legitimate and important 
part of the general and comparative study of religion, then the com-
parative study of religion will remain a half science20. 
People feel, think, act and symbolize. Pascal Boyer noted succinctly in 
his first book Tradition as Truth and Communication that scientific 
disciplines dealing with cultural traditions need strong psychological 
hypotheses before they can competently deal with tradition and the 
transmission of tradition.21 It strikes me as self-evident that the ideal 
approach is a combination of psychological, neurobiological and 
socio-cultural theories, methods and hypotheses. Furthermore, there 
are very good reasons for scholars of religion to take the lead. As I 
wrote in my contribution to the Online Conference on Religious Stud-
ies hosted by the Moscow Society for the Study of Religions, 2008: 
 
If we don’t take up the challenge, then the cognitive science of religion will be run 
exclusively by neurologists (many of whom are asking for help from the human sci-
ences), psychiatrists (with many disturbing and important observations), experimen-
tal psychologists (with interesting results in their dealings with people), anthropolo-
gists (our friendly competitors in the comparative study of religions), and philoso-
phers (challenging us on our methodological ploys and theoretical assumptions). 
Furthermore, we will be leaving by default all the hard work of writing popularizing 
literature on this extremely important topic to authors like Daniel Dennett and Rich-
ard Dawkins (with the result that people who don’t like them, won’t like us either)22. 
 
                                               
20 See my response to Michael Pye (from which this paragraph is taken) in the 2nd 
International Online Conference on Religious Studies (Moscow Society for the 
Study of Religions, 2008) on the theme “Comparative Religion: from Subject to 
Problem. http://e-religions.net/2008/index.php?lng=en 
21 PASCAL BOYER, Tradition as Truth and Communication: A Cognitive Description 
of Traditional Discourse, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. viii-ix. 
22 ARMIN W. GEERTZ, Comparative religion and cognitive science: Why should they 
meet?, «RELIGIO: Bulletin of the Moscow Society for the Study of Religions» 2, 
2009, p. 3; ID., New atheistic approaches in the cognitive science of religion: On 
Daniel Dennett, Breaking the Spell (2006) and Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion 
(2006), in Contemporary Theories of Religion: A Critical Companion, edited by 
Michael Stausberg, Abingdon & New York, Routledge, pp. 242-263. 
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A better understanding of cognition 
The CSR pioneers understand cognition as being more or less exclu-
sively a mental phenomenon. Lawson & McCauley23 as well as 
Boyer24 are concerned with cognitive representations and how they 
are reproduced. Boyer speaks of cognitive constraints, intuitive do-
mains and counterintuitive concepts. Whitehouse bases his work on 
types of memory and the role they play in cognitive representations25. 
Dan Sperber in his epidemiological account is concerned with two 
types of representations, mental representations and public representa-
tions26. Justin Barrett in some of his work, is concerned with counter-
intuitive representations or concepts27. 
As Paul Thagard has shown, there are six competing approaches to 
cognition that are based on computer analogies of the brain28. These 
ideas are based on the «physical symbol system hypothesis» in artifi-
cial intelligence research which basically assumes that the brain is 
analogous to a Turing machine. The latter is not generally held by 
neurologists today. As Gerald Edelman argued already in 1992, brains 
possess far too much individual variation at various organizational 
levels to be specified in the genome. The enormous ecological and 
environmental variation at play here «makes it unlikely that the world 
                                               
23 E. THOMAS LAWSON, ROBERT N. MCCAULEY, Rethinking Religion: Connecting 
Cognition and Culture, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990; ROBERT N. 
MCCAULEY, E. THOMAS LAWSON, Bringing Ritual to Mind: Psychological Founda-
tions of Cultural Forms, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
24 PASCAL BOYER, The Naturalness of Religious Ideas: A Cognitive Theory of Relig-
ion. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, University of California Press, 1994; ID., Re-
ligion Explained: The Evolutionary Origins of Religious Thought, New York, Basic 
Books, 2001. 
25 HARVEY WHITEHOUSE, Inside the Cult: Religious Innovation and Transmission in 
Papua New Guinea, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995; ID., Arguments and 
Icons: Divergent Modes of Religiosity, London & New York, Oxford University 
Press, 2000. 
26 DAN SPERBER, Explaining Culture: A Naturalistic Approach, Oxford, Blackwell 
Publishers, 1996. 
27 JUSTIN BARRETT, FRANK C. KEIL, Conceptualizing a nonnatural entity: Anthro-
pomorphism in god concepts, «Cognitive Psychology» 31, 1996, pp. 219-247; 
JUSTIN L. BARRETT, MELANIE A. NYHOF, Spreading non-natural concepts: The role 
of intuitive conceptual structures in memory and transmission of cultural materials, 
«Journal of cognition and culture» 1, 2001, 1, pp. 69-100. 
28 PAUL THAGARD, Mind: Introduction to Cognitive Science, Cambridge & London, 
The MIT Press, 1996, p. 128. 
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(physical and social) could function as a tape for a Turing machine»29. 
A second problem is the fact that human minds are characterized by 
having semantic contents, i.e. of producing meaning and not just me-
chanical syntax. In drawing on Searle, Edelman argues that meaning is 
interactional. The environment in this context plays a causal role in 
the production of meaning. Furthermore, the body plays a causal role 
in the production of meaning. In other words, nervous system re-
sponse patterns «depend on the individual history of each system, be-
cause it is only through interactions with the world that appropriate 
response patterns are selected»30. Many other neurologists have also 
taken issue with the cognitivist analogy of human cognition as a com-
puter, such as Terrence W. Deacon31, Chris Frith32, Joaquín M. 
Fuster33 and others. 
In his book The Meaning of the Body (2007), Mark Johnson rejects the 
philosophies of cognition and mind that build on a mental representa-
tional theory based on concepts and propositions. He rightly argues 
that our cognition is radically embodied in sensorimotor processes, 
and so is the process of meaning-making. «Meaning», he claims, 
«emerges, lives, and grows [...] in the bodily processes [....] Embodied 
meaning [...] emerges as structures of organism-environment interac-
tions or transactions»34. In this he has strong support from the work of 
Lawrence Barsalou35, Vittorio Gallese36 and many others. Johnson 
                                               
29 GERALD M. EDELMAN, Bright Air, Brilliant Fire: On the Matter of the Mind, New 
York, BasicBooks, 1992, p. 224. 
30 Ibi, p. 226. 
31 TERRENCE W. DEACON, The Symbolic Species: The Co-Evolution of Language 
and the Human Brain, London, Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1997. 
32 CHRIS FRITH, Making Up the Mind: How the Brain Creates Our Mental World, 
Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 2007; ANDREAS ROEPSTORFF, CHRIS FRITH & UTA 
FRITH, How our brains build social worlds, «New Scientist» 2737, 2009, pp. 1-3. 
33 JOAQUÍN M. FUSTER, Cortex and Mind: Unifying Cognition, Oxford, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2003. 
34 Johnson 2007, p. xii. 
35 BARSALOU, Perceptual symbol systems; LAWRENCE A. BARSALOU, Situated simu-
lation in the human conceptual system, «Language and Cognitive Processes» XVIII, 
2003, 5/6, pp. 513-562; LAWRENCE W. BARSALOU, KAREN OLSETH SOLOMON, 
LING-LING WU, Perceptual simulation in conceptual tasks, in Cultural, Typological, 
and Psychological Perspectives in Cognitive Linguistics: The Proceedings of the 4th 
Conference of the International Cognitive Linguistics Association, vol. 3, edited by 
M. K. Hiraga, C. Sinha & S. Wilcox, Amsterdam, John Benjamins, pp. 209-228. 
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argues emphatically: «Without a brain, there is no meaning. Without a 
living, acting body – no meaning. And without organism-environment 
interaction – no meaning»37. 
Our interactions with the world, especially the social world, has been 
forcefully argued by neuropsychologist Merlin Donald: 
 
We are culture-mongers, driven by the very nature of our awareness to seek refuge 
and solace in community. We connect with and learn from others to a unique degree. 
Symbolic thought is a by-product of this fact, and so is language. Both result from 
the collision of conscious minds in culture. The evolutionary origins of language are 
tied to the early emergence of knowledge networks, feeling networks, and memory 
networks, all of which form the cognitive heart of culture38. 
 
We cannot even use our brains without the help of culture. The whole 
heuristic exercise, therefore, of conceiving of human cognition with-
out culture is, as Clifford Geertz long ago pointed out, senseless: 
 
Undirected by culture patterns – organized systems of significant symbols – man’s 
behavior would be virtually ungovernable, a mere chaos of pointless acts and ex-
ploding emotions, his experience virtually shapeless. Culture, the accumulated total-
ity of such patterns, is not just an ornament of human existence but – the principal 
basis of its specificity – an essential condition for it39. 
 
There is, in other words, «no such thing as a human nature independ-
ent of culture»40. We were in fact culture-mongerers long before we 
appeared as a species. 
                                                                                                              
36 VITTORIO GALLESE, A neuroscientific grasp of concepts: From control to repre-
sentation, «Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London» 358, 2003, 
pp. 1231-1240; VITTORIO GALLESE, GEORGE LAKOFF, The brain’s concepts: The 
role of the sensory-motor system in conceptual knowledge, Cognitive Neuropsychol-
ogy 22, 2005, pp. 455-479. 
37 MARK JOHNSON, The Meaning of the Body: Aesthetics of Human Understanding, 
Chicago & London, The University of Chicago Press, 2007, p. 175. 
38 MERLIN DONALD, A Mind So Rare: The Evolution of Human Consciousness, New 
York & London, W. W. Norton & Company, 2001, p. 253. 
39 CLIFFORD GEERTZ, The impact of the concept of culture on the concept of man, 
[1966], reprinted in CLIFFORD GEERTZ, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Es-
says, 33-54. New York, Basic Books, Inc., 1973, p. 46. 
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We need an expanded view of what cognition is all about from the 
brain and body to mind and culture. As I have noted earlier: 
 
During the past decade, a paradigm based on the biological metaphor perceives hu-
man consciousness as situated in a web of neurobiological processes, cultural sym-
bols and social mechanisms. Here, culture is indispensable to the construction of 
mind, the ultimate cause of which is a mixture of genetic and epigenetic factors41. 
 
The close evolutionary interdependence between cognition and culture 
has been overwhelmingly argued by various scholars42. One can right-
fully argue, as Jesper Sørensen has done, that many of the so-called 
cognitive constraints are oftentimes cultural constraints43. 
So, what do scholars of religion have to do? Based on the central role 
that culture plays in our cognition, we need to analyze in more detail 
the myriad techniques that every culture and religion uses as cognitive 
governance systems. As I wrote elsewhere44: 
 
Cognitive governance systems are used to gain access to individual and collective 
minds and influence the way they see the world and each other. Learning how to 
attune oneself to these systems is the basic bread and butter of socialization. The 
latter involves specific techniques to interlink the infant’s attentional system with 
                                               
41 ARMIN W. GEERTZ, From apes to devils and angels: Comparing scenarios on the 
evolution of religion, in The Evolution of Religion: Studies, Theories, & Critiques, 
edited by Joseph Bulbulia, Richard Sosis, Erica Harris, Russell Genet, Cheryl Genet 
and Karen Wyman, Santa Margarita, Collins Foundation Press, 2008, pp. 43-49: p. 
43. 
42 See for instance EVA JABLONKA, MARION J. LAMB, Evolution in Four Dimen-
sions: Genetic, Epigenetic, Behavioral, and Symbolic Variation in the History of 
Life, Cambridge & London, The MIT Press, 2005; reprint, 2006; SUSAN OYAMA, 
Evolution’s Eye: A Systems View of the Biology-Culture Divide, Durham & London, 
Duke University Press, 2000; PETER J. RICHERSON, ROBERT BOYD, Not by Genes 
Alone: How Culture Transformed Human Evolution, Chicago & London, The Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 2005; reprint, 2006; KIM STERELNY, Thought in a Hostile 
World: The Evolution of Human Cognition. Oxford & Malden, Blackwell Publish-
ing, 2003; MICHAEL TOMASELLO, The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition, Cam-
bridge & London, Harvard University Press, 1999; reprint, 2000; Mary J. WEST-
EBERHARD Developmental Plasticity and Evolution, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2003. 
43 SØRENSEN, Religion, evolution. 
44 ARMIN W. GEERTZ, Brain, body and culture: A biocultural theory of religion, 
«Method and Theory in the Study of Religion» 2010 (in press). 
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those of others45. These techniques are universal and involve a range of facial, bod-
ily, sonic and linguistic manipulations meant to entice the child into the intricate 
web of the cultural scaffolding system. The point is not to download the system – no 
one can do this – rather to gain competence in using the cultural matrix. This learn-
ing process is transmitted through pedagogy, generation after generation, which 
gives the child the ability to maneuver the labyrinths of cultural meaning. As Donald 
argues, any nuance of gaze, gesture, tone of voice or facial expression is pregnant 
with meaning46. Thus, scholars of religion should pay attention to the earliest so-
cialization techniques, including styles of nursing47, touch, gaze and so on. These 
psychological techniques stimulate basic human abilities such as moral sensibility48, 
social intelligence49, mindsight50 and filling the “information gap” 51. 
 
Furthermore, we must reevaluate the enormous amount of narratives 
that we have collected during the past 170 years. We need to redirect 
                                               
45 DONALD, A Mind So Rare, p. 255. 
46 Ibi, p. 256. 
47 RELINDIS DZEAYE YOVSI, Ethnotheories About Breastfeeding and Mother-Infant 
Interaction: The Case of Sedentary Nso Farmers and Nomadic Fulani Pastorals 
with Their Infants 3-6 Months of Age in Mbven Sub Division of the Northwest Prov-
ince of Cameroon, Münster, Hamburg & London, LIT Verlag, 2003; SARAH 
BLAFFER HRYDY, Mothers and Others: The Evolutionary Origins of Mutual Under-
standing, Cambridge & London, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
2009. 
48 Moral Psychology. Volume 1: The Evolution of Morality: Adaptations and In-
nateness. Volume 2. The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity. 
Volume 3. The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Brain Disorders, and Develop-
ment, edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Cambridge & London, The MIT Press, 
2008. 
49 SARAH-JAYNE BLAKEMORE, UTA FRITH, The Learning Brain: Lessons for Educa-
tion, Oxford, Malden, Victoria, Blackwell Publishing, 2005; RAMSEY M. RAAFAT, 
NICK CHATER, CHRIS FRITH, Herding in humans, «TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences» 
XIII, 2009, 10, pp. 420-428; KAI VOGELEY, ANDREAS ROEPSTORFF, Contextualising 
culture and social cognition, «TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences» XIII, 2009, 12, pp. 
511-516. 
50 HELEN L. GALLAGHER, F. HAPPÉ, N. BRUNSWICK, P. C. FLETCHER, U. FRITH & C. 
D. FRITH, Reading the mind in cartoons and stories: An fMRI study of ‘theory of 
mind’ in verbal and nonverbal tasks, «Neuropsychologia» 38, 2000, pp. 11-21; 
HELEN L. GALLAGHER, CHRISTOPHER D. FRITH, Functional imaging of “theory of 
mind”, «TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences» VII, 2003, 2, pp. 77-83; NICHOLAS HUM-
PHREY, The Inner Eye, London, Faber and Faber Ltd., 1986; reprint, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2002, p. 94. 
51 GEERTZ, The impact of the concept of culture, p. 50. 
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our analyses towards social psychological themes and processes, i.e. 
how do narratives construct identities, whether in terms of gender, 
ethnicity or nationality. These same construction activities are also 
used to determine the identities of minorities, foreigners and periph-
eral categories of people. Narratives are essential in transforming vir-
tual, religious worlds into human, social realities52. It is essential, I 
believe, that we systematically rethink our narrative sources53. Narra-
tives define the world models that directly or indirectly govern us 
all54. These models are not inherent, they are inherited. They might 
not be rational, but they are assumed to be so. They might not even be 
                                               
52 DONALD, A Mind So Rare, pp. 295ff.; Roepstorff et al. 2009. 
53 See the coming volume on Religious Narrative, Cognition and Culture: Image 
and Word in the Mind of Narrative, edited by Armin W. Geertz, Jeppe Sinding Jen-
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Child’s Construction of the World, edited by Jerome Bruner, Helen Haste, London 
& New York, Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1987; LOUIS J. COZOLINO, The Neuroscience of 
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Robyn Fivush, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994; The Conceptual Self 
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A. Jopling, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997; ELINOR OCHS, LISA 
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ELINOR OCHS, LISA CAPPS, Living Narrative: Creating Lives in Everyday Storytel-
ling, Cambridge & London, Harvard University Press, 2001; JAMES L. PEACOCK, 
DOROTHY C. HOLLAND, The narrated self: Life stories in process, «Ethos. Journal of 
the Society for Psychological Anthropology» XXI, 1993, 4, pp. 367-383; Imagining 
the Impossible: Magical, Scientific, and Religious Thinking in Children, edited by 
Karl S. Rosengren, Carl N. Johson, Paul L. Harris, Cambridge, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2000; Narrative Psychology: The Storied Nature of Human Conduct, ed-
ited by Theodore Sarbin, New York, Westport & London, Praeger Publishers, 1986; 
DANIEL SIEGEL, The Developing Mind: How Relationships and the Brain Interact to 
Shape Who We Are, New York & London, The Guilford Press, 1999; ID., Toward an 
interpersonal neurobiology of the developing mind: Attachment relationships, 
“mindsight,” and neural integration, «Infant Mental Health Journal» XXII, 2001, 1-
2, pp. 67-94. 
54 DONALD, A Mind So Rare, pp. 324ff. 
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cohesive, but even that is glossed over as we try to get on in the world. 
Like our brains, so our cultures are busy map-makers, working indus-
triously to merge map with territory55. 
In order to produce, supplement, obtain and react towards this vast 
matrix of emotional and semantic networks, our cognition involves a 
great deal of activity outside the brain. Thus cognition is situated in 
these networks and social relations. It is distributed through the net-
works and extends itself into those networks. Recent work on cogni-
tion emphasizes these characteristics56. Prominent names in this line 
of research, known as “situated cognition”, are Edwin Hutchins, Andy 
Clark and Mark Rowlands57. Perhaps more interesting for historians of 
religions is the concept of “material anchoring,” prominent in cogni-
tive archaeology. This research argues that material objects and sym-
bols serve as cognitive anchors for the mind thus allowing minds to do 
things they would not ordinarily be able to do58. 
Scholar of religion Matthew Day picked up on this theme, arguing that 
«the broad spectrum of rituals, music, relics, scriptures, statues and 
buildings typically associated with religious traditions may be more 
                                               
55 FRITH, Making Up the Mind; CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Ethos, world view and the analy-
sis of sacred symbols [1957], reprinted in ID., The Interpretation of Cultures: Se-
lected Essays, New York, Basic Books, Inc., 1973, pp. 126-141; ID., Religion as a 
cultural system [1966], reprinted in ID., The Interpretation of Cultures, pp. 87-125. 
56 PHILIP ROBBINS, MURAT AYDEDE, A short primer on situated cognition, in The 
Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition, edited by Philip Robbins, Murat 
Aydede, Cambridge et al., Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 3-10. 
57 EDWIN HUTCHINS, Cognition in the Wild, Cambridge & London, The MIT Press, 
1995; reprint, 2000; ANDY CLARK, Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World 
Together Again, Cambridge & London, A Bradford Book, The MIT Press, 1997; Id., 
Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension, Philosophy of 
Mind, Oxford & New York, Oxford University Press, 2008; MARK ROWLANDS, Ex-
ternalism: Putting Mind and World Back Together Again. Montreal, Kingston, 
Ithaca, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003. 
58 LAMBROS MALAFOURIS, The brain-artefact interface (BAI): A challenge for ar-
chaeology and cultural neuroscience, «Social Cognitive and Affective Neurosci-
ence» 2010, pp. 1-10 (in press); STEVEN MITHEN, The Prehistory of the Mind: A 
Search for the Origins of Art, Religion and Science, London, Thames and Hudson 
Ltd., 1996; reprint, London, Phoenix, 1998; Cognition and Material Culture: The 
Archaeology of Symbolic Storage, edited by Colin Renfrew, Chris Scarre, Cam-
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than quaint ethnographic window dressing»59. Furthermore: 
 
Rather than thin cultural wrap arounds that decorate real cognitive processes going 
on underneath, these elements could represent central components of the relevant 
machinery of religious thought. By introducing tangible features of the world that 
can be physically manipulated and tracked in real-time, for example, the cognitive 
scaffolding that religious material culture affords seems tailor-made for allowing 
people to exchange the intricate “off-line” problems that arise from dealing with 
invisible, counter-intuitive supernatural agents for the kinds of “on-line” cognitive 
tasks they are naturally good at doing60. 
 
We surround ourselves, he notes in reference to Donald Norman, with 
«things that make us smart»61 and that help us break the boundaries of 
our brains. Day contends that religious rituals can be mind tools «that 
functionally extend the bare Darwinian brain’s aptitudes»62. 
Thus the cognitive science of religion needs to deal with research on 
materiality, location, spatial organization, social organization and sys-
tems theories. 
 
Tools for bodies and brains 
Such tools and gadgets that extend and materialize our minds and help 
us do things smarter and more efficiently are, however, a two-way 
street. Merlin Donald, for one, is concerned with the fact that our 
enormously powerful external memory banks have an equal and po-
tentially destructive impact back into our minds: «...the increasing 
number of potential foci, the higher turnover rates of information, and 
the speed with which we can shift time perspectives or change our lo-
cus in the memory stream have driven our conscious capacity to the 
wall»63. He calls it our «cerebral boxing match» with culture. At any 
rate, the patterns that emerge in culture «dominate the cognitive uni-
                                               
59 MATTHEW DAY, Religion, off-line cognition and the extended mind, «Journal of 
Cognition and Culture» IV, 2004, 1, pp. 101-121: p. 101. 
60 Ibidem, p. 101. 
61 DONALD NORMAN, Things that Make Us Smart, Reading, Addison-Wesley, 1993; 
DAY, Religion, off-line cognition, p. 112. 
62 DAY, Religion, off-line cognition, p. 114. 
63 DONALD, A Mind So Rare, p. 259. 
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verse that defines what “reality” is»64. 
If it was all just a question of mental procedures and innate cognitive 
constraints, then culture would not be such a powerful factor. The 
former stance ignores the fact that culture isn’t just is, it’s used. Cul-
ture is acquired through socialization techniques, imitation and delib-
erate pedagogy. And, as already mentioned, the techniques for learn-
ing how to master cultural matrices can also be used the other way 
around. There are many ways that culture with or without active hu-
man agents, can invade our minds. Active cultural agents have a ten-
dency to enforce cognitive management styles. It’s as if it comes with 
the package. Anything that has the potential of entrainment, attune-
ment, conformity and control will be used by people in power for 
various purposes. That is perhaps why politicians and priests – much 
like illusion artists – must by definition be adept illusionists. They tap 
into our natural moral sensibilities and belief in authority. Their main 
instrument is sincerity. When people discover they have been duped, 
they become extremely, almost viscerally, angry because they have 
been invaded and abused, thus reminding them how truly vulnerable 
they are. It makes sense, however, that for a collective system to work, 
individuals need to voluntarily mesh and intricate themselves into it. 
Donald calls it «deep enculturation». 
This vulnerability is not just mental or emotional. It is very physical, 
and that is because we more or less wear our bodies and brains on our 
shirtsleeves. Forgive the pun, but our nervous system is constructed as 
one whole system connecting outside and inside in one entity. The 
system is also connected to our limbic system and executive control 
system, thus allowing for the physical manipulation of body posture or 
various forms of suggestion in order to influence our emotional and 
mental states65. As I noted elsewhere: 
 
It is through these nervous systems that the ideas, values, and desires 
                                               
64 Ibi, p. 287. 
65 LAWRENCE W. BARSALOU, PAULA M. NIEDENTHAL, ARON K. BARBEY, JENNIFER 
A. RUPPERT, Social embodiment, «The Psychology of Learning and Motivation. 
Advances in Research and Theory» 43, 2003, pp. 43-92; PAULA M. NIEDENTHAL, 
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of other people can gain access to our brains and minds. Rituals are 
the most dramatic ways to manipulate bodily and mental states and 
thus change and direct our minds. Techniques that often are used to 
manipulate bodies are: 
 song, dance, clapping, swaying, jumping in place, hop-
ping 
 diverse body postures such as bowing, strutting, pros-
tration 
 other techniques such as torture and violence in initia-
tion rituals, vision rituals, and mysticism rituals 
 use of specific techniques for changing mental states 
such as smoking, alcohol, drugs, fasting, extreme 
movement or immobility, and photic and sonic drive 
techniques 
Music and rhythmic movement are extremely seductive methods66. 
They are clearly connected to early interactions between mother 
and child, involving stereotypy (simplification, formalization), 
repetition, exaggeration and elaboration, traits which in more ex-
panded form are central to religious rituals67. Thus ceremonies in-
volving such techniques tug deeply at the existential foundations of 
each and every individual and have the ability to arouse, shape and 
form emotions and mental states.68 
Lawrence Barsalou and his team in an article entitled Embodiment in 
religious knowledge69 argue that there are three main ways in which 
embodiment is at play: in religious visions, beliefs and rituals: 
 
In religious visions, the process of simulation offers a natural account of how these 
experiences are produced. In religious beliefs, knowledge about the body and the 
environment are typically central in religious frameworks, and are likely to affect the 
                                               
66 Music and Manipulation: On the Social Uses and Social Control of Music, edited 
by Steven Brown, Ulrik Volgsten, New York, Berghahn Books, 2006. 
67 ELLEN DISSANAYAKE, Homo Aestheticus: Where Art Comes From and Why, New 
York, The Free Press, 1992; reprint, Seattle & London, University of Washington 
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perception of daily experience. In religious rituals, embodiments appear central to 
conveying religious ideas metaphorically and to establishing them in memory70. 
 
Thus we need to go back to our sources and look more closely at how 
religions «use the body in conveying knowledge, implementing values 
and producing or changing mental and emotional states»71. We should 
pay more attention in general to body functions and the senses72. Bod-
ies are not just metaphors in religious texts, they are real, biological 
entities governed by sensibilities, values, norms and institutions. The 
way religions treat the body are highly indicative of the systems of 
thought and traditional assumptions behind such behavior. Such be-
havior is most often so tacit that scholars must pay special attention to 
the literature or contrive to conduct interviews in order to gain indirect 
access to those tacit assumptions. 
Bodies are also manipulated in healing systems. Healing systems re-
flect the religious worldviews in which they are anchored. The rituals 
that are applied during healing sessions are often a combination of a 
variety of techniques such as narrative therapy, suggestion and physi-
cal modulation or manipulation of the body. A key factor in such 
techniques is placebo73. Physician Ted J. Kaptchuk even argues that 
alternative healing rituals are “placebo dramas”, i.e. placebo is gener-
ated through performative efficacy which relies on «the power of be-
lief, imagination, symbols, meaning, expectation, persuasion, and self-
relationship»74. 
                                               
70 Ibi, p. 14. 
71 GEERTZ, Brain, body and culture, in press. 
72 DIANE ACKERMAN, A Natural History of the Senses, New York, Random House, 
Inc., 1990; reprint, New York, Vintage Books Edition, 1995; The Book of Touch, 
edited by Constance Classen, Oxford, Berg 2005. 
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74 TED J. KAPTCHUK, The placebo effect in alternative medicine: Can the perform-
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The brain, body and mind in religion 
Thus we come full round to Uffe Schjødt’s call for a scientifically rig-
orous neurobiology of religion75. Not everyone can do this, but the 
results of such studies should prove to be important for our under-
standing of religions as lived, embodied, situated and distributed sys-
tems of knowledge, emotions and memory. But it requires a critical 
reading of the methods and paradigms of such studies. 
A good example of how neurobiology can help us is the work of neu-
rologist Quinton Deeley. In his article The Religious Brain: Turning 
Ideas into Convictions, he argues that there are two major strategies 
that religious rituals employ which, in drawing inspiration from Clif-
ford Geertz’s famous definition of religion, «convey conceptions of 
the world and invest them with a heightened sense of reality and emo-
tion»76. These two are a sensory route and a semantic route. I will 
come back to these routes in a moment. His point of departure is that 
we act on the basis of our assumptions, beliefs and convictions. These 
convictions have enormous power, but where do they come from? 
Surely, powerful convictions are not solely the result of conceptualiza-
tion? There are two systems at play when convictions and salience are 
present: the limbic system and the monoaminergic systems. The lim-
bic system is the essential foundation of our emotional and social 
competencies77. It is in close contact with the prefrontal cortex (the 
area of executive functioning) and uses the endocrine system (hor-
mones) as well as the sympathetic (“fight or flight”) and parasympa-
thetic (“rest and digest”) nervous systems. The limbic system is modu-
                                                                                                              
tional processing: Induced expectations of anxiety relief activate a generalized 
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lated by the monoaminergic systems (such as neurotransmittors which 
are endogenous chemicals) of the brainstem. There can be no doubt 
that these are active during different religious experiences. 
Quinton Deeley argues that these systems strengthen our convictions 
and persuade us that they are “uniquely realistic”: 
 
Religious rituals, especially imagistic rituals,78 employ two major strategies to con-
vey conceptions of the world and invest them with a heightened sense of reality and 
emotion: (1) a “sensory” route evokes salient thought and experience by orchestrat-
ing multiple reinforcing social-emotional signals and other stimuli, engaging atten-
tion, emotion, and arousal; (2) a “semantic” route uses enigmatic verbal and non-
verbal symbols to engage an analogical/right hemispheric processing strategy to 
make sense of what is authoritatively presented as real but incompletely understood. 
Both routes are hypothesized to activate the mesolimbic dopamine system amongst 
other components of cognitive-affective processing, so that the “moods and motiva-
tions” evoked by the ritual performance seem “uniquely realistic”. These social, 
cognitive, and neural processes constitute ways in which religious ideas are turned 
into convictions79. 
 
Deeley draws on the “saliency hypothesis” whereby dopamine «medi-
ates the conversion of the neural representation of an external stimulus 
from a neutral and cold bit of information into an attractive or aversive 
entity»80. Shitij Kapur, Deeley’s colleague, shows that especially the 
mesolimbic dopamine system is a critical component «in the “attribu-
tion of salience”, a process whereby events and thoughts come to grab 
attention, drive action, and influence goal-directed behavior because 
of their association with reward or punishment»81. 
Neurologist V.S. Ramachandran describes in his book Phantoms in 
the Brain how some patients with temporal lobe epilepsy suffer from 
an overstimulation of “saliency pathways”. These pathways recognize 
the emotional significance of events because they are connected to the 
                                               
78 Here he is referring to Harvey Whitehouse’s modes of religiosity, i.e. the imag-
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79 DEELEY, The religious brain, p. 245. 
80 SHITIJ KAPUR, Psychosis as a state of aberrant salience: A framework linking 
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limbic system. Patients who suffer from such conditions experience 
things that resonate with many religious traditions around the world: 
 
Every object and event – not just salient ones – would become imbued with deep 
significance, so that the patient would see “the universe in a grain of sand” and 
“hold infinity in the palm of his hand”. He would float on an ocean of religious ec-
stasy, carried by a universal tide to the shores of Nirvana82. 
 
Ramachandran asks whether this is the origin of religious experience. 
It may not be the origin, but surely is at play in religious convictions 
and experiences! Whatever the connection may be, I am convinced 
that ecstatic ritual behavior somehow stimulates the saliency pathways 
which leads to an overproduction of meaning which in turn are sup-
ported and encouraged in many societies, even to the point of ac-
knowledging the power and authority of those who experience vivid 
saliency (shamans, spirit possession priests, oracles, etc.). I am in 
good company on this with, among others, neurologist Fred Previc 
who argues that the origins of religion are linked to «an expansion of 
dopaminergic systems in humans»83. 
 
What about history? 
This is all well and good, but what about history? History is, after all, 
what most scholars of religion work with. There is a rapidly growing 
literature on the origins of religion, cognition and culture84, but it 
seems as if the focus of cognitive studies jumps from studies of the 
cognitive abilities of modern-day American psychology students to 
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speculations, however informed they may be, on the cognition of Aus-
tralopithecines. Furthermore, interest in the Homo sapiens line hardly 
extends further than the cave paintings of 25,000 years ago. Why 
aren’t there studies about what’s in between? There are, of course, a 
few such studies. The pioneers of the cognitive science of religion 
have demonstrated what can be done with sources that are typical in 
the study of religion. Lawson and McCauley applied their ritual com-
petence theory and ritual form hypothesis on well-known examples as 
wide-ranging as Hindu rituals, the Christian Eucharist and Zulu initia-
tions. Whitehouse based his modes of religiosity hypothesis on a re-
cent millenarian movement among the Pomio Kivung of Papua New 
Guinea. Pascal Boyer’s examples of religious concepts and rituals are 
taken from modern indigenous tribes in Africa. Stewart Guthrie has 
applied his insights on Japanese village religiosity and modern Ameri-
can advertisements and media. 
There are several scholars now working on historical topics such as 
Luther H. Martin85, Istvan Czachesz86 and Panayotis Pachis87, but this 
is still uncharted territory. There are two problems in applying cogni-
tive theory to historical topics. The first is that the cognitive science of 
religion has, as already mentioned, a methodological proclivity to de-
lete the cultural equation, and it is thus very difficult for cultural sci-
entists to apply those theories. The second is that only a few theories 
seem to be useful to historical studies. Whitehouse’s modes theory has 
proven to be useful, as a number of publications indicate88. Most of 
the other theories have only been of interest to cognitive scientists of 
religion who are pursuing psychological experiments. 
                                               
85 LUTHER H. MARTIN, History, cognitive science, and the problematic study of folk 
religions: The case of the Eleusinian Mysteries of Demeter, «Temenos. Nordic Jour-
nal of Comparative Religion» 39-40, 2003-2004, pp. 81-99. 
86 ISTVÁN CZACHESZ, The promise of the cognitive science of religion for Biblical 
studies, «Bulletin of the Council of Societies for the Study of Religion» XXXVII, 
2008, 4, pp. 102-105. 
87 Panayotis Pachis, Imagistic modes of religiosity and the study of the cults of 
Graeco-Roman world, in Imagistic Traditions in the Graeco-roman World: A Cog-
nitive Modeling of History of Religious Research, edited by Luther H. Martin, 
Panayotis Pachis, Thessaloniki, Vanias Editions, 2009, pp. 15-34. 
88 Theorizing Religions Past; Imagistic Traditions in the Graeco-roman World: A 
Cognitive Modeling of History of Religious Research, edited by Luther H. Martin, 
Panayotis Pachis, Thessaloniki: Vanias Editions, 2009. 
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A collection of studies on historical themes is in press at the mo-
ment89, but what we also need is to develop hypotheses and theories 
that are both historical and experimental. The recent collection of es-
says in Natural Experiments of History, edited by Jared Diamond and 
James A. Robinson, may be a possible avenue for historically oriented 
scholars of religion90. Simulation approaches, such as those being 
conducted by Donald Braxton, are another possible avenue. Braxton 
argues that despite the weaknesses of computer simulations, they al-
low us to formulate historical hypotheses that may be tested either by 
computer simulations or by other means91. This exercise is quite valu-
able for historians of religions because it encourages them to think 
much more theoretically and much more empirically than usual. The 
exercise requires historians to think more formally about their hy-
potheses, whether these are implicit or explicit. Stark’s interesting at-
tempts at applying sociological theories to early Christianity, weak-
nesses notwithstanding, should serve as an example of how cognitive 
theories and hypotheses might be applied to historical topics92. 
 
A way forward 
We need to develop constructive criticisms of results from the cogni-
tive science of religion. We must test their theories, but we must also 
test our own theories. The study of religion must develop a true com-
parativism and re-invent a true humanism by building bridges between 
disciplines.93 If the academic study of religion won’t do these things, 
others, who are less competent in comparative religion, will. 
To cognitive scientists of religion, I have no better comment than that 
expressed by Mark Johnson: 
                                               
89 Past Minds, edited by Luther H. Martin, Jesper Sørensen, London, Equinox, 2010 
(in press). 
90 Natural Experiments of History, edited by Jared Diamond, James A. Robinson, 
Cambridge & London, Harvard University Press, 2010. 
91 DONALD M. BRAXTON, Beyond sui generis religion: When neither Eliade nor 
postmodernism suffice, «Zygon» XLIV, 2009, 2; ID., Modeling the McCauley-
Lawson ritual form hypothesis, in Religious Ritual, Cognition, and Culture, edited 
by Armin W. Geertz, Jesper Sørensen. London, Equinox, 2010 (forthcoming). 
92 RODNEY STARK, The Rise of Christianity: How the Obscure, Marginal, Jesus 
Movement Became the Dominant Religious Force, New York: HarperOne, 1997. 
93 EDWARD SLINGERLAND, What Science Offers the Humanities: Integrating Body 
and Culture, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008. 
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There are certain popular theories of mind and language that are incompatible with 
empirical evidence about the brain and cognition. If your favorite theory is at odds 
with this research, then you ought to be worried, and you ought to be asking whether 
you need to rethink some of your cherished hypotheses94. 
 
One example of just such a cherished hypothesis is any theory of lan-
guage that builds on neural modularity or similar claims about dedi-
cated systems. 
What is needed in the cognitive science of religion are more women 
scholars and more philosophers of science conversant with the cogni-
tive sciences. Furthermore, we need more research on religion and... 
gender, children, socialization, violence, location, authority, healing, 
the senses, bodily manipulation, war, liberation, repression, identity 
and memory. More research on cognition and texts and on cognition 
and history. More research on embodiment and a critical revisiting of 
religious experiences. Furthermore we need better theories and crea-
tive hypotheses that are more resonant with what we know about hu-
man bodies and minds. And we need to deal creatively in developing 
natural experiments both in the wild and in the laboratory. 
Can the comparative study of religion meet these challenges? I believe 
it can, mainly because of European sensitivity to cultural traditions. 
All we need to do is acknowledge that cognition is a combination of 
embrainment, embodiment and enculturation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
94 JOHNSON, The Meaning of the Body, p. 156. 
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Περίληψη 
 
Το άρθρο αυτό βασίζεται στις εργασίες που διεξάγονται σε μία ερευνητική ομάδα 
της οποίας είμαι επικεφαλής και ονομάζεται Θρησκεία, Νόηση και Πολιτισμός (Re-
ligion, Cognition and Culture – RCC). Αρχικά είχε σχεδιαστεί ως ένα ιδιαίτερο πε-
δίο έρευνας από το Τμήμα Θεολογίας στο Πανεπιστήμιο και εν συνεχεία ενσωμα-
τώθηκε ως μία ανεξάρτητη ερευνητική μονάδα στο Τμήμα Μελέτης της Θρησκεί-
ας.95 Σε μία πρόσφατη ανακοίνωση του RCC, υποστηρίζουμε ότι οι άνθρωποι είναι 
συγχρόνως βιολογικά και πολιτισμικά όντα. Σε ολόκληρη την ιστορία των ανθρω-
ποειδών, η ανθρώπινη βιολογία και οι πολιτισμός δεν έχουν ποτέ διαχωριστεί. Κάθε 
νεογέννητο βρέφος είναι συγχρόνως ημιτελώς και μοναδικά εξοπλισμένο, βιολογικά 
και γνωσιακά οργανωμένο να ανθήσει σε κοινωνικο-πολιτισμικά περιβάλλοντα που 
ποτέ τα γονίδιά του δεν θα μπορούσαν να προβλέψουν. Επομένως απαιτείται μία 
προσέγγιση του νου δεν περιορίζεται στον εγκέφαλο. Έτσι πρέπει να προσεγγίζουμε 
τη νόηση ως ενσωματωμένη και διανεμημένη. Πρέπει να αναλύουμε τη θρησκεία 
μελετώντας τη λειτουργική οργάνωση του ανθρώπινου εγκεφάλου, την αλληλεπί-
δρασή του με τους κοινωνικούς και πολιτισμικούς κόσμους στους οποίους ζει και 
τους οποίους τροποποιεί, και τους αναπτυξιακούς περιορισμούς και την ευελιξία 
του. Το RCC είναι προφανώς ένας ευρωπαϊκός θεσμός. Διαφέρει ως προς την προ-
σέγγισή του στη νόηση από κάποια, λίγα σε αριθμό, ιδρύματα στις Ηνωμένες Πολι-
τείες, την Αγγλία και τη Βόρεια Ιρλανδία που ασχολούνται με τη νόηση και τη θρη-
σκεία. Ωστόσο, το RCC είναι παρόμοιο ως προς την προσέγγισή του με άλλες ευ-
ρωπαϊκές πρωτοβουλίες όπως την ομάδα νόησης στο Χρόνινγκεν και το ερευνητικό 
πρόγραμμα στο Ελσίνκι. Επομένως θα μπορούσαμε να ισχυριστούμε ότι η προ-
γραμματική επιμονή μας στους αιτιακούς δεσμούς ανάμεσα στη θρησκεία, τη νόηση 
και τον πολιτισμό είναι μία παραδόξως ευρωπαϊκή προσέγγιση. Στη συνέχεια, θα 
εξηγήσω πώς η γνωσιακή επιστήμη της θρησκείας μπορεί να γίνει περισσότερο σχε-
τική με τη συγκριτική μελέτη της θρησκείας και με την πιο πρόσφατη γνωσιακή 
επιστήμη ακολουθώντας την ευρωπαϊκή προσέγγιση. 
 
                                               
95 Το παρόν άρθρο αποτελεί εκτενώς επεξεργασμένη εκδοχή της εναρκτήριας διά-
λεξής μου που παρουσιάστηκε στο συνέδριο της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης για τη Μελέ-
τη των Θρησκειών (EASR) στη Μεσσίνα το 2009 με τίτλο «Religion, Cognition and 
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